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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO F ! L ED 
ALAN DA VIS, SPECIAL 
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 
ESTATE OF 
SAMUEL H. SHEPP ARD 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
ST ATE OF OHIO 
Defendant 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant, by and through counsel, William D. Mason, Prosecuting Attorney for Cuyahoga 
County, moves this Court for Summary Judgment under Ohio Civil Rule 56. The grounds for this 
Motion are that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and Defendant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law, as more fully set forth in the Brief and Exhibits, attached hereto and as may be 
provided in supplemental amendments. 
By: 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM D. MASON 
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
(216) 443-7800 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff, Alan Davis, Special Administrator of the Estate of Samuel H. Sheppard, filed 
this wrongful imprisonment action against the Defendant, State of Ohio, averring the wrongful 
incarceration of Sheppard. This action comes thirty years after his acquittal at his second trial 
and twenty-six years after his death. The passage of time and the death of the individual 
imprisoned are fatal obstacles to the civil action now before the court. 
First, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this cause of action. The tort 
of wrongful imprisonment abates under R.C. 2305.21 with the death of the one claiming the 
injury. Therefore, this tort cannot be brought by a decedent's personal representative. A cause 
of action for wrongful imprisonment, like the torts of slander and false imprisonment, cannot 
survive the death of the individual claiming the harm because such claims involve a violation of 
a personal right as distinguished from an actual physical injury. See Witcher v. Fairlawn (1996), 
113 Ohio App.3d 214, 217-218; Oakwoodv. Makar (1983), 11Ohio.App.3d46. 
Second, Plaintiff, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Samuel H. Sheppard, lacks 
standing to bring this action. The statute only authorizes the wrongfully imprisoned individual to 
commence and maintain the action. And the executor or administrator of an estate does not have 
standing to assert a violation of a personal right and recover after the death of the one statutorily 
authorized. See US. v. Kerner (C.A.7, 1990), 895 F.2d 1159; Heikkila v. Barber (C.A.9, 1962), 
308 F.2d 558, 561-562. Ergo, this action cannot, and does not, survive the death of Sheppard. 
Third, assuming, arguendo, the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction and Plaintiff 
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-Alan Davis, as Special Administrator of Sheppard's Estate, indeed has standing, the statute of 
limitations for bringing this action has long since expired. R.C. 2743.16; Lewarski v. Columbus 
Dev. Ctr. (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 76; R.C. 2305.11; R.C. 230507; R.C. 2305.09. The accrual 
date for purposes of the statute of limitations is November 16, 1966, the date of Sheppard's 
acquittal. Sheppard had always maintained his innocence and, therefore, his wrongful 
incarceration. An alternate accrual date, should this court find otherwise, is November 13, 1967, 
the date Sheppard filed a federal actioq seeking compensatory damages for his wrongful 
incarceration. And, giving Sheppard the benefit of every doubt, the last possible accrual date is 
September 24, 1986, the effective date of Ohio's Wrongful Imprisonment Statute. Under all 
three potential accrual dates, the time for commencing this action has expired. 
Fourth, regardless of the applicable statute of limitations, the equitable doctrine of lac hes 
should be applied to this case. Defendant can successfully establish the requirements of laches, 
in that there was an unreasonable delay, the absence of an excuse for the delay, Plaintiffs 
knowledge of the alleged wrong, and prejudice to Defendant, State of Ohio, if this action 
proceeds. 
Finally, as a matter of public policy, to force any defendant to proceed to trial, despite 
these fatal procedural road blocks, exposes it to an unmanageable, unpredictable, and costly 
potential of countless similar trials. The mere contention that a new-technology may disclose 
additional information and, hence create a corresponding claim despite the lengthy passage of 
time and the death of the individual allegedly damaged is not only legally impermissible but is 
violative of sound public policy. The law mandates finality. Constant relitigation and the 
arbitrary extension of statutes of limitations deny others access to the judicial system. 
2 
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II. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about October 19, 1995, Alan Davis, Special Administrator of the Estate of 
Samuel H. Sheppard, (hereinafter "Plaintiff'), filed a Motion for Declaration of Wrongful 
Imprisonment in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Criminal Division, under case 
number, CR 64571. Specifically, that case number is the case captioned State of Ohio v. Samuel 
Sheppard, the criminal prosecution of Sheppard, which action was first commenced by way of 
indictment in August of 1954. Several related pleadings and motions followed. Subsequent to 
this filing, the State of Ohio successfully argued and thus persuaded counsel for the Sheppard 
Estate that Ohio law requires the filing of a civil action, to wit: a complaint and summons in the 
Civil Division of the Court of Common Pleas. 
As a result, on or about July 24, 1996, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant, State 
of Ohio, (hereinafter "Defendant"), alleging wrongful imprisonment and seeking a Declaration of 
Innocence. The case was assigned by random draw to the Honorable Kathleen Sutula. It was 
transferred, however, to the docket of the Honorable Ronald Suster based upon a representation 
by counsel for Plaintiff on the designation sheet that there existed a "related" case, CR 64571, on 
Judge Sutula's docket. That case is not a pending matter and not related to this civil action for 
wrongful imprisonment. As a result of this request, Defendant filed objections to the transfer of 
the case to the docket of the Honorable Ronald Suster but such objections were overruled and the 
case was transferred. 
A series of pleadings and motions was filed in this case, including a Motion to Dismiss, 
an Answer, an Amended Answer, and a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. At all times 
relevant, Defendant asserted that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear this wrongful imprisonment 
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claim; the statute of limitations has expired; the plaintiff lacks standing, and; the action does not 
survive under Ohio's Survival Statute, R.C. 2305.21, or at common law. Defendant's Motions 
were overruled. 
In June of 1997, Defendant filed in the Supreme Court of Ohio, a Petition in Prohibition 
seeking both an immediate Alternative Writ and a Writ. The Alternative Writ in Prohibition 
issued, but the court ultimately overruled the Petition in Prohibition in December of 1998, 
reasoning that "although [Defendant's] arguments may have merit, * * * , the avenue ofredress 
is an appeal, not a writ of prohibition." State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 
70, 74, 76, 77. 
Accordingly, at this point in the trial court proceedings, the assertions of lack of 
jurisdiction and standing, the expiration of the statute of limitations, and !aches are now brought 
before this court by virtue ofthis Motion for Summary Judgment. 
III. CIV.R. 56 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Summary Judgment under Civ.R. 56 is warranted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986), 477 U.S. 317, 322; Anderson v. Liberty Lobb, 
Jnc.(1986), 447 U.S. 242. "Once the moving party has presented evidence sufficient to support a 
motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party is not entitled to trial merely on the basis 
of allegations; significant probative evidence must be presented to support the complaint." 
Goins v. Clorox Co. (C.A.6, 1991), 926 F.2d 559, 561. When deciding ifthere are issues of fact 
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sufficient for trial, "the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts* * * must be viewed in 
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Matsushita Electric Industries Co. 
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. (1986), 475 U.S. 574, 587. 
In this case, even construing all the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Alan 
Davis and the Estate of Sheppard cannot first demonstrate that the court has subject matter 
jurisdiction; that Plaintiff has standing; and alternatively that this action is not time barred by the 
statute of limitations, and laches. Plaiµtiff has provided no significant probative evidence in 
support of his claim. Repackaging evidence that has been available for decades and "spinning" 
the meaning of scientific data to fit the interests of Plaintiff does not rise to a level sufficient to 
overcome a summary judgment request. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
oflaw since no genuine issue of material fact exists under Civ.R. 56. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS CASE BECAUSE A CLAIM FOR 
WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT ABATED 
UPON THE DEATH OF SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD. 
This cause of action for wrongful imprisonment died with Sam Sheppard in 1970. Ohio's 
Wrongful Imprisonment Statute, R.C. 2743.48, as well as this state's common law and statutory 
authority clearly do not authorize the survival or revival of a claim for wrongful imprisonment. 
Hence, no one else, including one's estate, can assume a decedent's right ofrecovery for a tort 
that involves a loss of a personal right. 
R.C. 2305.21 governs the survival of causes of action after the death of the one claiming 
the injury, and reads in pertinent part: 
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In addition to the causes of action which survive at common law, 
causes of action for * * * injuries to the person * * * shall 
survive; and such actions may be brought notwithstanding the 
death of the person entitled or liable thereto. (Emphasis added). 
As to the first part of the statute regarding common law survival, "[t]here existed no 
remedy at common law for a wrongfully imprisoned citizen to pursue an action against the state 
for damages incurred as a result of his incarceration." Wright v. State (1990), 69 Ohio App.3d 
775, 779. "The action was created by R.C. 2305.02 and 2743.48 is a waiver of the state's 
\ 
common law sovereign immunity, and has no parallel in the ancient dual system of law and 
equity." Walden v. State (1989), 47 Ohio St.3d 47, 53. 
Survival in this case then, under R.C. 2305.21, depends upon whether a cause of action 
for wrongful imprisonment constitutes an action for "injuries to the person." 
Ohio law is clear that "injuries to the person" means physical injuries. Witcher v. 
Fairlawn (1996), 113 Ohio App.3d 214, 217; Oakwood v. Makar (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 46, 47. 
In analyzing which claims survive, courts have distinguished between a personal right and a 
physical injury. And only actions for physical injury survive. 
Under law, this court can come to but one conclusion - that the tort of wrongful 
imprisonment is an action for a violation of a personal right, not a physical injury, and abates at 
death. 
Personal rights encompass injuries to one's character or reputation. Flynn v. Relic (June 
26, 1980), Cuyahoga App. No. 41404, unreported. It concerns, for instance, the deprivation of 
the plaintiffs freedom of movement; an infringement upon the plaintiffs liberty to move about 
at will rather than a physical injury. Witcher, supra at 218. Certainly, wrongful imprisonment 
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involves a person's liberty and freedom of movement rather than an actual physical injury. 
Torts such as false imprisonment and malicious prosecution do not survive because they 
are violations of personal rights not physical injuries. Id.; State ex rel. Crow v. Weygandt (1959), 
170 Ohio St. 81. Likewise, wrongful arrest, a violation of a personal right, does not survive. See 
Heikkila v. Barber (C.A.9, 1962), 308 F.2d 558, 561-562. 
The following review of Ohio common law and statutory authority on abatement and 
survival unequivocally supports a conc;,lusion adverse to Plaintiff. 
Noteworthy is the fact that in all of the below analyzed cases, the plaintiff actually 
commenced the proceedings in his own name but died during the pendency of the action. And in 
each case, the claim was dismissed at the trial court and upheld on appeal. In this case, there is a 
posthumous commencement for a violation of a personal right, posing an even stronger set of 
facts for its abatement and dismissal. 
In Witcher, the plaintiff sued police officers of the city of Fairlawn for false 
imprisonment alleging he was wrongfully detained at a mall store. During the pendency of the 
proceedings, the plaintiff died and his wife filed a suggestion of death and substituted herself as 
the administratrix of his estate. Id. at 215. The defendant-city of Fairlawn moved to dismiss the 
complaint asserting that the tort of false imprisonment did not survive the plaintiffs death. The 
trial court agreed, as did the appellate court, and held that because the claim of "false 
imprisonment involves an injury to the personal rights of the plaintiff and not injuries to the 
plaintiffs body," it did not survive his death. Id. at 218. In so holding, the court rejected the 
plaintiffs argument that false imprisonment, by its very nature, requires some sort of physical 
restraint tantamount to a physical injury. Id. at 219. The court agreed that false imprisonment 
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will always include an element of force or threat of force to compel a person "to remain where he 
does not wish to remain* * * ." Id. But this does not change the nature of a violation of this very 
personal right. Id. 
Similarly, the Honorable August Pryatel in the Oakwood case reversed a judgment for an 
award of damages relating to slander when, during the pendency of the proceedings, one of the 
defendants died. Id. at 48. The trial court substituted the deceased's husband and executor as a 
successor party and the case proceeded to judgment. Id. at 47. Judge Pryatel held that the trial 
I 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because the deceased's executor could 
not be substituted as a party. The action of slander, a violation of a personal right, abates at the 
death of either of the parties to the suit, making any substitution of a party a legal impossibility. 
Id. 
This court likewise lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff cannot be 
substituted as a party. The tort of wrongful imprisonment abated with the death of Sheppard and, 
therefore, this cause of action should be dismissed. 
V. THE ESTATE OF SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD LACKS STANDING 
TO BRING A CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT 
Plaintiff, Alan Davis, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Samuel H. Sheppard, 
lacks standing to commence this cause of action. The plain and unambiguous language of the 
subject statute does not authorize an estate to bring this claim. Accordingly, the Estate, by and 
through its Special Administrator, cannot be Sheppard's successor plaintiff. 
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Lack of standing challenges the capacity of a party to bring an action. State ex rel. Jones 
v. Suster (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 77. Therefore, standing is a "threshold question" which this 
court must decide in order for this action to proceed. Id. "The lack of standing may be cured by 
substituting the proper party so that a court otherwise having subject matter jurisdiction may 
proceed to adjudicate the matter. Civ.R. 17 ." Id. (Emphasis added). 
In this case, the issue of standing cannot be cured first, because the court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction. Id. And, second, eyen if it did have jurisdiction, the only party having 
standing - Sheppard himself - is deceased. And an estate cannot assert a violation of a personal 
right under the statute and common law. 
The undisputed facts compel this tribunal to conclude that Plaintiff therefore lacks 
standing. Sheppard's Estate cannot be compensated for a loss of income and associated expenses 
incurred by Sheppard during his lifetime had he not been convicted, even if actual damages to 
the Estate are proved. See US. v. Kerner (C.A.7, 1990), 895 F.2d 1159. 
A. The Plain and Unambiguous Language of Ohio's 
Wrongful Imprisonment Statute does not authori~e anyone other 
than Samuel H. Sheppard from commencing this action. 
R.C. 2743.48, by its plain language, affords redress only to those individuals claiming 
this right and does not allow redress to their heirs, representatives, and assigns. 
The court in Wright v. State (1990), 69 Ohio App.3d 775, when confronted with an 
interpretation of the language of the subject statute, duly noted the judiciary's role in reviewing 
legislation and restrained itself as follows: 
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It is not the judiciary's function to rewrite laws according to what 
the court perceives as just but to enforce the literal writing of the 
statute whenever possible. Bd. of Edn. v. Fulton Cty. Budget 
Comm.(1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 147, [citation omitted]. Regardless 
of the method of interpretation used, absent ambiguity, a court will 
not delve into legislative intent but will give effect to the plain 
meaning of the statute, R.C. 1.49, even when a court believes that a 
statute results in an unfavorable outcome. It is the province of the 
legislature to gauge public sentiment and to determine what is 
just." Wright, supra, at 781. (Emphasis added). 
"In our tripartite system of government, the power to make law is vested within the 
\ 
legislature and not the judicial branch. No legislature, regardless of foresight, can anticipate 
every situation that is likely to arise. Therefore, courts are called upon to interpret laws when 
unique fact patterns are presented. However, the court can only interpret and not legislate. 
[citation omitted]." Id. 
Accordingly, courts do not have authority to ignore plain and unambiguous language of a 
statute under the guise of statutory interpretation, but must give effect to the precise words used, 
being mindful not to add to, or subtract from, the statute. In re Collier (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 
232. Further, words must be taken in their usual, normal or customary meaning. Love v. 
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 86 Ohio App. 3d 394. 
In Ohio, the specific inclusion by the General Assembly of items in a statute implies the 
exclusion of others. Kirsheman v. Paulin (1951), 155 Ohio St. 137, 146; Investors Reit One v. 
Jacobs (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 176. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, i.e., "The certain 
designation of one person is an absolute exclusion of all others. [citation omitted]." Black's Law 
Dictionary (6 Ed.Rev.1990) 763. As such, the inclusion of the word "individual" in the 
Wrongful Imprisonment Statute implies the absolute exclusion of the words "representative, 
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-heirs, and assigns." Thus, the action may only be brought by the individual claiming a violation 
of the right. 
Evidence of the General Assembly's intent to limit eligibility for compensation under the 
Wrongful Imprisonment Statute is found in R.C. 2743.48(B)(l): 
When a court of common pleas determines, * * *, that a person is 
a wrongfully imprisoned individual, the court shall provide the 
person with a copy of this section and orally inform him and his 
attorney of his rights under this section to commence a civil action 
against the state * * * because of his wrongful imprisonment and 
\ 
to be represented in that civil action by counsel of his own choice. 
(Emphasis added). 
Such language demonstrates a clear contemplation that the litigant himself be present. Hence, 
had the General Assembly intended that someone in Plaintiffs stead could bring this action, it 
would have so expressly provided. It is not within the authority of the court to extend clear and 
- unambiguous language to areas where that very language was designed to exclude. 
As stated, the Wright court was confronted with an interpretation of the precise language 
of the subject statute. Specifically, that court addressed the issue of whether Ohio's Wrongful 
Imprisonment Statute applies to juveniles who were wrongfully incarcerated even though the 
statute does not expressly apply to juveniles. Wright, supra at 778. The court engaged in an 
analysis of the exact nature of the statute, finding it to be remedial not penal and intending it to 
correct past injustices. Id. at 779-780. The court then concluded that the "remedial intent 
should be honored ifthere is ambiguity by adopting a liberal construction of the statute." Id. at 
780. However, in so concluding, the Wright court refused to extend the remedy to juveniles, 
finding that the language is "written strictly in adult criminal language [and further] that [i]t 
-
11 
--
must be presumed that the legislature knew of the separate and independent procedures used in 
the juvenile justice system when it chose the words that it did." Id at 781. (Emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Dragon v. State (1988), 48 Ohio App.3d 72, 73, the court failed to expand 
the subject statutory language to include compensation for time spent incarcerated on an 
incorrect revocation of probation. The Dragon court held that the express language in R.C. 
2743.48 does not include an award for an incorrect probation revocation. Id. The court reasoned 
that, had the General Assembly intend(;(d the statute to so provide, "it would have expressly done 
so." Id. 
In Mueller v. State (Dec. 12, 1988), Warren App. No. 88-05-037, unreported, the court 
was confronted with whether the General Assembly intended that there be a collateral estoppel 
effect given in the civil action for wrongful imprisonment based upon the not guilty verdict in the 
underlying criminal case. The Mueller court held that "[n]o such intent is stated specifically in 
the statutes* * * ." Id. at 2. And therefore, the court refrained from adding to the express 
words of the subject statute. 
The decision and reasoning of the Wright, Dragon, and Muelier courts compel the same 
result in this case. It must be presumed that the General Assembly knew of the separate and 
independent procedures used in those seeking this remedy while still alive and those 
posthumously seeking a remedy by a personal representative. This court should therefore find 
that the express words of the statute do not apply to anyone other than the one claiming the right. 
Hence, the scope of remediation is clearly limited to the "individual" by the very 
language of the statute. 
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B. Sheppard's Estate cannot maintain this action because 
the law does not provide for compensation 
to anyone other than Sheppard himself. 
The statutory provision upon which this claim rests does not allow persons in Plaintiffs 
position a right to relief. See Warth v. Seldin (1975), 422 U.S. 490, 500. Because a plaintiff 
must generally assert his own legal rights and interests and cannot bring his claim for relief on 
the legal rights or interests of a third party, Sheppard's Estate, by and through its Special 
Administrator, cannot assert Sheppard's legal rights. Kerner, supra. Further, there is no 
allegation in Plaintiffs complaint as to any injury by virtue of wrongful imprisonment to anyone 
other than the deceased, Samuel H. Sheppard. 
In Kerner, the plaintiff as executor and son of the decedent, sought a writ of error coram 
no bis, by and through his father's estate, brought thirteen years after his father's death. In it, 
plaintiff sought compensation to the estate based upon a recent change in the law which 
posthumously invalidated his father's criminal conviction for mail fraud. The action further 
requested that his other criminal convictions based upon the mail fraud conviction also be 
vacated. The Kerner court agreed that the estate indeed suffered actual damages from his 
father's convictions but, significantly, plaintiff, as executor of his father's estate, lacked standing 
and the action was dismissed. Id. at 1161, 1162. The court reasoned that a convicted defendant 
who died no longer personally suffered any lingering civil disabilities and reputational and 
financial injuries alone are insufficient. Id. at 1161. While this federal case involves the 
extraordinary remedy of a specific writ, the import of its reasoning is applicable in this case and 
compels the same result. Plaintiff lacks standing under the subject statute's clear and 
unambiguous language. 
13 
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There is no issue before this court which can be asserted by the Estate and its Special 
Administrator as a representative or successor plaintiff. Accordingly, the court must grant 
judgment to Defendant as a matter of law. 
VI. ASSUMING THIS COURT HAS SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION AND PLAINTIFF HAS STANDING, 
THIS ACTION IS TIME BARRED UNDER 
ALL POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE LIMITATIONS STATUTES. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the subject action is indeed a legally viable cause of action 
properly brought before a court with subject matter jurisdiction, then this action is barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
Statutes of limitations are statutes of repose. They are designed to secure the peace of 
society and are enacted to prevent delay in asserting claims. The object and purpose of these 
statutory time limitations are to encourage diligence in the enforcement of demands and the 
speedy adjudication of the rights of parties. See generally, 66 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1986), 
Limitations and Laches, Section 2. 
Regardless of which statutory section and accrual date is applied, the action is time 
barred. 
A. THE ACCRUAL DATE FOR THIS CAUSE OF ACTION IS 
EITHER NOVEMBER 16, 1966, NOVEMBER 13, 1967, OR SEPTEMBER 24, 1986. 
The starting point in this discussion is the accrual date, or the date upon which the cause 
of action "arose" for purposes of the statute of limitations. "In general, a cause of action exists 
from the time the wrongful act was committed." O'Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp. (1983), 4 Ohio 
14 
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St.3d 84, 86. But in situations where this general rule would lead to an unconscionable result 
such that the injured party's right to recovery is time barred before he is made aware of the 
injury's existence, the accrual date is when actual damage or injury occurs. Id. citing Kunz v. 
Buckeye Union Ins. Co. (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 79; Velotta v. Leo Petronzio Landscaping, Inc. 
(1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 376, paragraph two of the syllabus; Wyler v. Tripi (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 
164, 168. 
The Wrongful Imprisonment Statute is silent on this issue. And [a ]bsent legislative 
definition, it is left to the judiciary to determine when a cause 'arose.' [citation omitted]." 
0 'Stricker, supra at 87. 
In this case, and applying the general rule, this cause arose when the alleged wrongful act, 
arguably Sheppard's indictment, was committed, as he had always maintained his innocence. 
However, should this court decide that the application of the general rule would produce an 
unconscionable result, then the court should find that the date of Sheppard's acquittal, 
November 6, 1966, is the accrual date. It was then that Sheppard knew, for purposes of the 
statute oflimitations, of his alleged injury. See Rogers v. Barbera (1960), 170 Ohio St. 241 
(malicious prosecution accrues when proceedings are terminated in plaintiffs favor); Maxey v. 
Gather (1952), 94 Ohio App. 115, 118 (action for false imprisonment accrues when disability of 
imprisonment is removed on plaintiffs release date); Twine v. Probdte Court, Franklin Cty. 
(June 28, 1990), Franklin App. No. 89AP-1170, unreported, at 2 (discharge date of plaintiffs 
invalid detention at a hospital is the accrual date). 
Hence, this cause of action accrued when the proceedings were terminated in Sheppard's 
favor, November 16, 1966. See, Rogers, supra. 
15 
A second possible accrual date, however, resulted from Sheppard's own action and 
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inaction during his lifetime. Sheppard filed a federal claim for wrongful incarceration and failed 
to file a related state claim when he had the opportunity; hence providing evidence of his 
awareness of his alleged injury and accompanying request for compensation for such injury. 
Just under one year from his acquittal date, on November 13, 1967, Sheppard commenced 
a civil action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio seeking 
compensatory damages for his wrongfµl imprisonment, rendering November 13, 1967 an 
alternate accrual date. (A copy of the complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit A). Sheppard sued 
E.W. Scripps Company, publisher of The Cleveland Press, Louis B. Seltzer, its Editor, and 
Samuel Gerber, Cuyahoga County Coroner. 
Sheppard's federal lawsuit essentially averred a cause of action for wrongful 
- imprisonment. It was dismissed by the district court and its dismissal was affirmed on appeal. 
-
Sheppard v. The E.W. Scripps Company (C.A.,6, 1970), 421 F .2d 555. (the court held that the 
newspaper's publisher and editor, as private citizens, had not acted "under color of any state law" 
and Gerber, the Coroner, a quasi-judicial officer, was protected by sovereign immunity). Id. 
Sheppard's complaint sought compensatory damages for: 
(1) his imprisonment for approximately ten years in various jails and prisons m 
the State of Ohio; 
(2) a loss of income for thirteen years as a physician licensed in the State of Ohio; 
(3) fees, costs, and expenses of defending himself against the indictments and 
judgments wrongfully procured, and; 
(4) the loss of reputation and community respect suffered as a result of these 
proceedings. 
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The remedies sought are specifically provided for under R.C. 2743.48, Ohio's Wrongful 
Imprisonment Statute. Number one above avers imprisonment in Ohio jails and prisons. R.C. 
2743.48(A)(3). Number two avers a loss of income, a compensation provided for under R.C. 
2743.8(E)(2)(c). And number three requests reimbursement for all costs associated with his 
defense, as provided for under R.C. 2743.48(E)(2)(a). 
The filing of the federal lawsuit unequivocally establishes Sheppard's knowledge of the 
alleged wrong and his intent to recove, for such wrong. As such, and alternatively, the accrual 
date would have been the date upon which he filed a federal claim for wrongful imprisonment. 
In sum, Sheppard could have joined the State of Ohio as a defendant in his 1967 federal 
claim. But he did not. He could also have filed a state claim for malicious prosecution under 
Ohio tort law after his federal claim was dismissed on procedural grounds, as the circuit court 
instructed. ("An action for malicious prosecution might have been filed in state court, but that 
does not render unavailable the remedies of the Civil Rights Act."). Sheppard v. E. W Scripps, 
supra, at 559, fn. 1 (McCree, J., concurring). But he did not so file, even after being put on 
notice of other possible remedies. Sheppard could also have filed a claim for wrongful 
imprisonment under Ohio's moral claims legislation. See Walden v. State (1989), 47 Ohio St.3d 
47, 49. But he did not. 
Hence, his failures to so file and seek redress for his alleged injuries in state and federal 
courts not only invoke the statute of limitations based upon either of the above discussed accrual 
dates, but demonstrate Sheppard's abandonment of any such future claims. 
Whichever interpretation of accrual is applied, the result is still the same. This action 
cannot be maintained under the statute of limitations. 
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The most generous interpretation of accrual, however, yields the effective date of the 
subject statute, September 24, 1986. Ohio's Wrongful Imprisonment Statutes, R.C. 2305.02 and 
2743.48 were added to the Revised Code in 1986 to authorize civil actions against the state for 
specified monetary amounts brought by certain wrongfully imprisoned persons. Walden, supra, 
citing 141 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5351. This replaced "the former practice of compensating 
wrongfully imprisoned persons by ad hoc moral claims legislation. See, generally, Comment, 
Wrongful Incarceration in Ohio: Shoul~ There Be More Than A Moral Obligation? (1982), 12 
Cap.U.L.Rev. 255." Id. 
Because Sheppard's acquittal pre-dated this legislation, the effective date of this statute 
operates as an alternate accrual date. 
But applying all three accrual dates, the action is still time barred. 
1. THE APPLICATION OF R.C. 2305.07 
TIME BARS THIS ACTION. 
The most generous statute in terms of time permitted to bring this cause of action is R.C. 
2305.07 and reads: 
Except as provided in sections 126.301 and 1302.98 of the Revised 
Code, an action upon a contract not in writing, express or implied, 
or upon a liability created by statute other than a forfeiture or 
penalty, shall be brought within six years after the cause thereof 
accrued. (Emphasis added). 
The potential liability of the state was arguably created by statute, specifically, R.C. 
2305.02 and 2743.48. As noted by the Supreme Court of Ohio, "[t]he enactment ofR.C. 2743.48 
was necessary to authorize compensation because the state, even after the waiver of sovereign 
immunity in R.C. 2743.02, remained generally immune from lawsuits by persons who were 
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wrongfully convicted and incarcerated." Bennett v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1991), 60 
Ohio St.3d 107, 110. Hence, while wrongfully incarcerated individuals could bring an action 
against the state, the subject statute authorized compensation and allowed "recovery in some 
cases when recovery was not available before." Id. at 111. 
Thus, the state's liability, albeit through the authorization of compensation, was indeed 
created by statute. But this action, under the six year limit in R.C. 2305.07, is still time barred 
using the dates November 16, 1966, Noyember 13, 1967 or September 24, 1986. 
2. THE APPLICATION OF R.C. 2347.16 
TIME BARS THIS ACTION 
R.C. 2743.16 reads in relevant part: 
* * * civil actions against the state * * * permitted by sections 
2743.01to2743.20 of the Revised Code shall be commenced no 
later than two years after the date of accrual of the cause of action 
* * *. (Emphasis added). 
Defendant, the State of Ohio, statutorily waived its immunity from liability and consented to be 
sued under R.C. 2743.02 (A)(l), which provides in relevant part: 
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and consents to 
be sued, and have its liability determined, in the court of claims 
created in this chapter in accordance with the same rules of law 
applicable to suits between private parties, subject to the 
limitations set forth in this chapter. 
Because this is a civil action against the state which is expressly permitted by R.C. 
2743.02, clearly within the category of statutory sections contemplated in R.C. 2743.16(A), the 
applicable statute of limitations is two years from the date of accrual. 
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In Lewarski v. Columbus Dev. Ctr. (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 76, 78, the court, in a 
vvrongful incarceration action filed against state agencies, applied the two year limit in R.C. 
2743.16 and held that the action was barred for failing to timely file. The Lewarski plaintiff filed 
his action in 1984, two years prior to the effective date of the Wrongful Imprisonment Statute. 
Hence, vvrongful imprisonment prior to the enactment of the subject statute - which statute 
merely authorized specific compensation - had a two year limit. And this court should likewise 
apply this two year limit for the same CflUSe of action. 
Hence, using all three accrual dates, this action is out of rule by decades. 
3. THE APPLICATION OF R.C. 2305.11 
TIME BARS THIS ACTION. 
Assuming this court finds R.C. 2743.16(A) inapplicable, then the statutory section 
governing limitations on false imprisonment applies as the subject tort has its origin in false 
imprisonment. 
The General Assembly enacted the Wrongful Imprisonment Statute in order to address a 
"narrow legal problem" as explicated above. Bennett, supra, at 110 .. In review, that problem 
was, despite the state's waiver of sovereign immunity in R.C. 2743.02, it still remained largely 
immune from lawsuits brought by innocent persons for compensation who were wrongfully 
convicted and incarcerated. Id. So this separate statute provided for ~pecific compensation in an 
already existing claim for wrongful imprisonment. Id.; R.C. 2743.48(E) & (F). The immunity in 
question, however, was derived from the law governing the tort of false imprisonment. Id. 
(Emphasis added). As such, "R.C. 2743.48 does not replace the false imprisonment tort but, 
rather supplements it to allow a recovery in some cases when recovery was not available 
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before." Id. at 111. (Emphasis added). 
Because the tort of wrongful imprisonment is a derivative of the tort of false 
imprisonment, the statute of limitations for false imprisonment alternatively applies to this 
action. 
R.C. 2305.11 reads in relevant part: 
(A) An action for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, or false 
imprisonment, * * * shall be commenced within one year after 
the cause of action accru~d. (Emphasis added). 
Again, using any of the three possible accrual dates, 1966, 1967, or 1986, this action is 
time barred. 
4. THE APPLICATION OF R.C. 2305.09 
TIME BARS THIS ACTION. 
Should this court find that none of the above applies, then the catch-all statute, R.C. 
2305.09, would apply and Sheppard would have had four years from the accrual date within 
which to have brought this action. 
That section reads in pertinent part: 
An action for any of the following causes shall be brought within 
four years after the cause thereof accrued: 
(A) For trespassing upon real property; 
(B) For the recovery of personal property, or for taking or 
detaining it; 
( C) For relief on the ground of fraud; 
(D) For an injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising on 
contract nor enumerated in sections 2305.10 to 2305.12, 
2305.14 and 1304.34 of the Revised Code. 
21 
--
-
The relevant section is (D) and that section can best be analyzed by way of a process of 
elimination of the above listed statutes. 
First, the injury does not arise on contract. And, second, assuming for the sake of this 
argument that the false imprisonment limitation statute, R.C. 2305.11, is inapplicable, this action 
does not fall within any of the enumerated sections. Hence, the wrongful imprisonment cause of 
action could possibly fall within this statutory section and is still time barred. 
Ergo, this court, if it finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction and proceeds then to grant 
Plaintiff standing and further rules that this action for a violation of a personal right survives 
Sheppard's death - all against existing case and statutory authority - then this action is barred by 
the statute of limitations and must be dismissed as a matter of law. 
IV. THE EQUITABLE DEFENSE OF LACHES 
BARS THIS ACTION. 
If this court disregards all of the above procedural bars, then it must find that the 
equitable defense of laches bars this action. 
Laches is an omission to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained period of 
time. State ex rel. Scioto County Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Gardner (1996), 113 
Ohio App.3d 4. The defense of !aches is available where there is: 
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(1) an unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right; 
(2) the absence of an excuse for delay; 
(3) actual or constructive knowledge of the injury or claimed 
wrong; and; 
(4) prejudice to the party for whose benefit the defense is invoked. 
State ex rel. Polo v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Elections (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 143. In this case, 
all four elements are met. 
I 
This case does not present a situation where a plaintiff, through some form of disability, 
was unable to proceed with litigation. Rather, in this case, so much time has passed and the only 
legally cognizable plaintiff is deceased. Certainly, the equitable principles of jurisprudence bar 
this action. 
First, the delay in bringing this action is indeed unreasonable. Sheppard was acquitted at 
his second trial on November 16, 1966. Less than one year later, on November 13, 1967, he 
filed a civil action against, inter alia, the then Cuyahoga County Coroner, seeking damages for 
his wrongful imprisonment in Ohio jails and prisons, loss of reputatic~n and further seeking 
compensation for his loss of income and bills accrued from his defense. As discussed above, 
Sheppard could have joined the State of Ohio in that action but did not. Moreover, he could have 
filed state claims at that time. Sheppard v. E. W Scripps, supra at 559, fn. 1. But he did not. 
Further, in 1986, the General Assembly enacted the Wrongful Imprisonment Statute. 
Plaintiff filed nothing until 1995, when a complaint (albeit improperly filed in the closed 
criminal case) was commenced in this court. The proper complaint was filed in 1996, forty-two 
(42) years after Marilyn Sheppard's murder, thirty (30) years after Sheppard's acquittal at his 
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second trial, twenty-nine (29) years after his federal claim was filed, twenty-six (26) years after 
its dismissal, and ten (10) years after the enactment of the subject statute. Certainly this delay is 
unreasonable. 
Second, there exists no viable excuse for the unreasonable delay in asserting this claim. 
Sheppard always maintained his innocence and corresponding wrongful imprisonment. 
Evidence of this is his previously filed federal claim, just one year after his acquittal. 
Plaintiff may assert that Sheppard's innocence is now provable by new scientific 
advances, specifically DNA technology, which was not heretofore available. However, DNA 
evidence has been used in criminal cases as early as 1987. Andrews v. Florida (1988), 533 So.2d 
841. And its use was affirmed on appeal in 1988. Id. Hence, the delay in bringing this action 
over seven years after its initial debut in a criminal case is indeed unreasonable. 
Third, Sheppard obviously had knowledge of his alleged wrongful incarceration. Further, 
and conceding nothing herein, if the Estate can be a successor plaintiff, then knowledge is 
imputed to it just as if it were Sheppard himself, thereby satisfying the third element of !aches. 
Fourth, Defendant has been significantly and unfairly prejudiced by the delay in Plaintiff 
asserting this claim. Evidence has grown old and has been exposed to contamination. Witnesses 
have likewise grown old, some have died, and memories have faded. Further, no chain of 
evidence has been preserved since, as a matter of policy, law enforcement agencies and other 
related offices rightfully rely on benchmarks, such as the statutes of limitations on actions, in 
developing policies for records retention and disposition of evidence from trial. In fact, much of 
the evidence in the underlying criminal case was returned to Sheppard or his family upon his 
acquittal leaving open at the very least the legitimate concern of evidence contamination, let 
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alone availability. 
Defendant therefore can satisfy all four requirements of the equitable defense oflaches 
and this court should apply it to bar further litigation in this case. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The legal arguments presented above - jurisdiction, standing, abatement and survival, and 
time bar are rooted in equity jurisprudence and public policy interests. 
If the legal concepts advanced herein do not procedurally bar this action, then no citizen 
can be confident of the finality of any court proceeding and all statutes of limitations would be 
rendered meaningless. 
Justice does not require, and should not permit, the substitution of an estate of an 
individual who may have had a colorable claim when he was alive, particularly in light of the 
fact that Sheppard himself pursued legal recompense after his acquittal in federal court, but failed 
to assert, and therefore abandoned, any corresponding state claim. The General Assembly did 
not intend, and could not have intended, that survivors of formerly incarcerated individuals be 
vested with the right to pursue such a claim into perpetuity. 
Procedurally, this court first lacks subject matter jurisdiction to maintain this action. 
Second, Plaintiff, by and through Alan Davis as Special Administrator of the Estate of Samuel H. 
Sheppard, lacks standing to pursue this claim. Not only did this action die with Sheppard, but 
the General Assembly did not contemplate a plaintiff to recover in a representative capacity 
under the wrongful imprisonment statute. 
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A copy of the foregoing Motion for Summary Judgment was mailed this \ 0 day of 
September, 1999, to Terry H. Gilbert and George H. Carr, 1700 Standard Building, 1370 Ontario 
Street, Cleveland, Ohio. 
By: 
-EXHIBIT A 
Copy of Complaint 
Filed in Federal Court 
November 13, 1967 
!;UM MONS IN A CIVIL ACTION CIV. l (2-U) (Tor111trl1 D. ~ ,..,,.,. Ha.. U Jt_.. ('-Ct)) 
llhtitcll ;§.tnfc.s ili.stt."icf <!rourf 
-
FOR THE 
Nnrfl!rl"ll iJir.frid ·f (J:)r • ,_ 
'' : irr•i. ,iir:r:.h-r11 .i'.litiisiu11 
CIVIL ACTION FILE No .................... . 
Samuel H. Sheppard l ·1 
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-.: 
Plaintiff SU!\rn!ONS :.-:: 
v. 
The.E. W. Scripps Company, 
Louis B. Seltzer, 
Samuel R. Gerber 
Defendant s 
-·1 the above named De!cndant s: 
You are hereby summoned and required to serve upon Russell A. Sherrn<in 
ptaintiIT's attorney , whose address is 205 Elyria Savings & Trust Bldg., 
Elyria, Ohio 
c. 
;: .. ~ !"·' 
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an answer to the complaint which is herewith served upon you, within 20 dnya aflcr service of this 
summons upon you, exclusive of the clay of service. If you fail to do so, judgment by default wilJ be taken 
11gainst you for the relief demanded in the complaint. 
C. U. WAn: Ii·!.'' . 
-··r··-'1_. --·--····· ··- .. ·--
__ fL&:._.~ ... :~.-rk.vf=·iC·. 
A. I . Nixon ( l5•p1tly Cler!<- -
Date: 11/13/67 [Seal of Court] 
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C fn'r"j ~"" (.. v .. ,· ;: () <..) r ..... · ...... _.a: ':-,__ • . ,, ~ .. ~ o: .. _.,,~ 
~r THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
URT, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
~ASTERN DIVISION 
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD, 
Plaintiff 
vs 
THE E.#w. SCRIPPS COMPANY, et al, 
Defendants 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
- issell A.Sherman 
.• ttorney for Plaintiff 
205 E.S.T. Bldg. 
Elyria, Ohl'! 
·-
FI LED 
Uov 13 ID sJ All '67 
CLEO~ II. 5. OIJTRICT COURT 
llORT1H:n11 01srn1cr OF OlilO 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
EASTERN DIVISION 
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD 
33 Mosel Str. 
Duisburg, .West Germany, 
Plaint Hf 
vs 
THE E. W. SCRIPPS COMPANY 
901 Lakeside Ave. 
Cleveland, Ohio 
LOUIS D. SELTZER 
17825 Lake 
Cleveland, Ohio 
SAMUEL R. GERBER 
11424 Cedar Rd. 
Cleveland, Ohio, 
Defendants 
c 67-838 
CIVIL NO. 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
1. The Plaintiff, Samuel !!. Shepyarcl presently 
resides at and is domiciled in Duisburg, West Germauy. The Defen-
dants, Louis B. Seltzer and Samuel R. Gerber are citizens of the 
State of Ohio. The Defendant, The E. W. Scripps Com11any ls a 
corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Ohio. 
2. This action arlseo under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States under title 42 §1983 
of the United States Code. The matter in controversy exce~ds, 
exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of Ten Thous~nd and 00/10 
Dollars ($10,000.00). 
3. T~e Defendant, Louis B. Seltzer was, at the tim 
i 
i 
·1 
I 
! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
of the wrongs herein complained of, the editor of a newspaper call d I 
I 
I 
I 
"The Cleveland Press"; said newspaper was published by the Defen-
dant, The E. W. Scripps Company. 
4. The Defendant, Samuel R. Gerber, was at the tim 
of the wrongs complained of, and still is, the coroner of Cuyahoga 
County, State of Ohio. As such coroner, he had the duty and the 
authorl ty to investigate and repo:d_£~~.ses of deaths -~~curring 
---·- ·-·-----··------- ·--·-··- ..... _ .......... _ .. __ ·-----
within said County. 
.... --·-···-···-··· ... r·· 1 
I 
i 
I 
·-.:I 
. ( 
--
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5. The Plaintiff, Samuel H. Sheppard was in 1954, 
a physician residing and practicine; in Cuyahoga County, State of 
Ohio, and specializing in neurosurgery. The Plaintiff in 1954 had 
an active and successful medical practice. 
6. On or about the 4th day of July, 1954, Marilyn 
Sheppard, then the Plaintiff's wife, was murdered iu her home on 
Lake Road in Bay Village, Ohio by n person or persons to the Plain 
' 
tiff unknown. 
7. Follov1ing such murder, the Defen•hmt, Samuel R. 
Gerber, commenced an investigation lnto its causes and into the 
identity of the person or persons responsible for lt. 
8. Following the murder, the Defendants, Louis B. 
Seltzer and The E. W. Scripps Company commenced an editorial attac 
upon the Plaintiff in the Cleveland Press, which was designed _and 
calculated to, and did in fact, cause elective prosecuting offi-
--------- ---- _., ______ ._ ... -----
cials to accuse him of complicity aforesaid. 
·-·--···---· --
9. Between July 14, 1954 and July JO, 1954, the 
Defendants, Louis B. Seltzer and The E. W. Scripps Company cons-
pired with the Defendant, Samuel R. Gerber, to implicate, accuse, 
arrest and indict the Plaintiff for the said murder, even though 
each of said Defendants well knew that the Plaintiff had nothing 
to do with the murder of Marilyn Sheppard. It was part of said 
conspiracy·that the Defendant, Samuel R. Gerber, would use his 
,,.,. ~ ... 'H-"'W'·''"t"• ... .-:•0 .-.T·u•-· ... .--"\.•• '"°•"" • ~ r·•• ,.,,... • \••"" t"' ~·· . .o'' •. ,. • .... ' .• •r , •• , ....... - • .,,..,. • ...,, "-~~ "' 4 ''- ,.,,,_,... •_ • .,.••\ .. ,_flt,.,.-..·~- •o,,..,_ 
"official position as coroner to act under color of state law and 
_.,._..,..-., ......... ~ ........ ~ .. ·-···•-':''··· .. ··••• ......... ,_ ••••• , 1•·-~··..._ •. ,.._ ...... ....................... - ... - ......... ______ ._""_'"_.._-----
wrongfully implicate, and cause to be tried, the Plaintiff. 
T""'"~ .... ,4 -;r..,,.. .... , ... ~ ......... - .. '"1'"''1'"•1''-~ ... -u""' .... ,.....-..... "' '"'"-..... ··•·: .. _.,. ·.:·,. .. "'~ -·"'"'""- .......... 7"· ........ .. 
........ ·~·-·' · 10. It was further a part of the co us piracy afore-
said that the Defendants, Louis B. Seltzer and The E. W. Scrlpps 
-
Company ~ould mount and launch an attach upon the Plaintiff cal-
---·---·-···-----··-------.... ------·--·- - -· -- -
culated to prevent him from obtaining a fair trial before an im-
.. ------·-
-· ...... -- --· ·---·--------- ..... 
-par.tXal --J~~y- ~~--~- -f~-ir--j~d.i~·:··-i't--~~-~ -r~;ther a part of the said 
-~~~-~-pl;;~y--i~·r···t·h;·D·~-r~-~d-~~ts, Louis B. Seltzer and The E. w. Seri ps 
Company to so influence, intimidate and control the trial judge 
who presided at Plaintiff's criminal trial for the murder of his 
....... ____ _ 
wife, Marilyn Sheppard, as to cause said judge to muke wrongful 
. ----·--------------! 
--J-
and adverse rulings to the Plaintiff. It was furth~r a part of 
said conspiracy for the Defendant, Samuel R. Gerber, to issue 
..... ----
s~~QJ;_§_§_~gg~st~_of Plaint~ s guilt before an impartial 
~-- ...... jury could be selected; and to give false and prejudicial testi-
.----------""-----~--- ... -.-..... __ __._~"'-~--,.--,-------~ .. ':'·• 
~y_agai-ns.t-the ... P~.Le..!!9:~.l!.~.-~.~-·-~·;.s_ ... :~.~~~.~. It was further a part 
of the conspiracy for the Defendants, Louis B. Seltzer, and The 
, 
E. W. Scripps Company to publish, during the trial, and to thus 
call to the attention of the Plaintiff's petit jury, hearing the 
case against him, prejudicial and inadmissible muterlal which the 
Defendants well knew could not reach said jury in the courtroom 
·' 
and which the Defendants knew woul<l. cause the Plaintiff's wrong- i 
ful conviction. 
--·-·- 11. The Defendants effectuated each of the above-
described illegal and wrongful acts, and thus caused, as planned, 
-the wrongful conviction of the Defendant. 
12. In so conspirine; and acting, lhe Defendants 
deprived the Plaintiff of his Federal constitutional right to a 
fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
lJ. By so conspirine; and actln[5, the Defendants 
deprived the Plaintiff ofi Due Process of Law under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
14. By so conspirine; and acting, the Defendants 
deprived the Plaintiff of the rights, privileges, a11d immunities 
secured to him by the United States Constitution. As a result of 
such conspiracy and action by the Defendants, 1.he rlaintiff has 
been damaged, (1) by his imprisonment for approximately ten years 
in various jails and prisons in the State of Ohio, (2) by a loss 
of income for thirteen years as a physician licens~in the State 
of Ohio, (J) by the fees, costs, and expenses of defending him-
self against the indictments and judgments wrongfully procured as 
set forth above, and (4) by the loss of reputation and community 
respect suffered as a result of these proceedings. 
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands: 
1. ~hat the Defendants be required to pay to the 
Plaintiff such damages as Plaintiff has sustained in consequence 
of Defendants' unlawful acts as aforesaid. 
2. That Plaintiff have such other and further 
relief as the law and justice may require. 
A trial by jury ls hereby requesteu. 
F. Lee Bailey 
Forty Court St. 
Boston, Massachusetts 
Benjamin L. Clark 
50 West Broad St. 
Columbus, Ohio, 
Of Counsel 
' 
~ u sell A. Sherman, 
Attorney for rlaintiff 
205 Elyria Savings & Trust Bl g. : 
Elyria, Ohio 
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